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Abstract 
There is increased interest in the relationship between motor skills and social skills in child 
development, with evidence that the mechanisms underlying these behaviors may be linked.  
We took a cognitive approach to this problem, and examined the relationship between four 
specific cognitive domains:  theory of mind, motor skill, action understanding and imitation.  
Neuroimaging and adult research suggest that action understanding and imitation are closely 
linked, but are somewhat independent of theory of mind and low-level motor control.  Here we 
test if a similar pattern is shown in child development.  A sample of 101 primary school aged 
children with a wide ability range completed tests of IQ (Raven’s matrices), theory of mind, 
motor skill, action understanding and imitation.  Parents reported on their children’s social, 
motor and attention performance as well as developmental concerns.  The results showed that 
action understanding and imitation correlate, with the latter having a weak link to motor 
control.  Theory of mind was independent of the other tasks.  These results imply that 
independent cognitive processes for social interaction (theory of mind) and for motor control 
can be identified in primary school age children, and challenge approaches that link all these 
domains together. 
1. Introduction 
Cognitive psychologists have traditionally studied human development within distinct domains.  For 
example, social cognition (often exemplified by theory of mind tasks) has been studied separately 
from motor skill or visual skill.  However, it is increasingly recognized that there may be links in the 
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brain and cognitive systems underlying these different types of skill.  The present paper aimed to 
examine the claim that motor and social skills develop in concert.  To do this, we tested a large 
sample of primary school age children on a number of cognitive tasks designed to target theory of 
mind, mirror neuron systems, imitation and motor systems, and examined correlations between 
performance in these different domains.   
 
1.1. Mechanisms underlying motor and social behavior. 
In the present paper, we take a cognitive approach to development, meaning that we are 
interested primarily in the information processing mechanisms underlying different behaviors.  We 
consider the information processing mechanisms of motor behavior, social behavior and all other 
behaviors including affect, language and perception, to all fall within the realm of cognitive 
neuroscience (Gazzaniga, 2004).  We distinguish specific domains within this realm, and are guided 
in this classification by our knowledge of adult neuroscience.   The present paper focuses on four 
distinct domains: social cognition, motor cognition, imitation and mirror neuron systems, which 
contribute in different ways to both motor behavior and social behavior.   
 
Tasks used to assess social cognition in children include mentalizing (thinking about others’ 
thoughts), emotion and face recognition, and many other aspects of social behavior.  The current 
study focuses on mentalizing in order to examine specific claims about the relationship between 
mentalizing and mirror neuron systems (Gallese, Rochat, Cossu, & Sinigaglia, 2009;  Hamilton, 
2009). Tasks commonly used to assess motor cognition include performing hand actions, sequencing 
actions, whole body movements and balance.  The current study focuses on planning and sequencing 
of hand actions, again because these are most closely linked to mirror neuron systems (Tunik, Rice, 
Hamilton, & Grafton, 2007).  Tasks used to assess mirror neuron systems, which may contribute to 
both motor and social behavior, include imitation tasks and action understanding tasks.  
Developmentally, rapid improvements are seen in all of these tasks over infancy with development 
continuing in the primary school years (Bushnell & Boudreau, 1993; Jones, 2009).   
 
1.3. Hypothesized links between cognitive domains: 
We can distinguish three different hypotheses for the relationship between different cognitive 
domains: (1) independent domains, (2) a single domain and (3) domains interacting over 
development, and we describe each hypothesis in turn.  Other hypotheses such as dynamical systems 
are also possible, but we return to these in the discussion (McClelland, 2010). 
 
1.1.1. The independent domains hypothesis 
 
Traditional neurocognitive approaches tend to view different domains as independent.  For example, 
different systems such as language, mentalizing and motor control were considered largely distinct.  
In particular, mentalizing is considered as a highly specialized skill drawing on abstract abilities such 
as meta-representation (Perner, 1991) and quite unlike motor skills.  If this were the case, we would 
expect development of mentalizing to be independent of development in motor control.   
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Neuroimaging data also suggest that the different social and motor tasks described above draw on 
distinct brain networks.  Mentalizing tasks reliably activate a brain network including medial 
prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction (Frith & Frith, 2003).  Tasks involving understanding 
of actions or imitation typically activate a different brain network in the inferior parietal and inferior 
frontal lobe (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010).  These brain regions are commonly referred 
to as the mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) and thus we will describe the tasks that 
activate these areas as mirroring tasks.  Finally, motor tasks may engage mirror neuron systems but 
also draw on cerebellum and basal ganglia (Middleton & Strick, 2000).  Thus, the domains of 
mentalizing, mirroring and motor control are at least partially distinct in terms of brain systems.  The 
present paper aims to test if they are also distinct in terms of development. 
1.1.2. The single domain hypothesis 
 
Even if brain and cognitive systems for mirroring and mentalizing are distinct in adulthood, it is 
possible that they develop from a single, primary system.  For example, it has recently been 
suggested that ‘action cognition’ provides a basis for many different social-cognitive skills (Gallese 
et al., 2009).  Building on the discovery of mirror neurons, which respond when a monkey performs 
an action and also sees another person act, it has been suggested that performing and understanding 
action is the developmental origin of human social skills. The idea put forth by the action cognition 
theory is that proficiency in social interactions fundamentally relies on the motor system to decode 
the movements of others to allow for attributions of intentions and mental states. The logic being 
employed here is this; when we observe another person’s movement our own motor system is 
activated in a way analogous to if we were performing the same action ourselves. It is this activation 
that allows us to introspect on what our intentions would be if we were performing that action and 
this would allow an inference about why the person is performing the action. Some papers have made 
further claims linking the mirror neuron system to empathy, theory of mind and social skills more 
broadly (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004) including the failure of social skill in autism 
(Rizzolatti, Fabbri-destro, & Cattaneo, 2009).  Under such a framework, adequate development of 
motor and mirror systems (jointly) is essential for the development of social skill, and there is a direct 
causal relationship between the development of these cognitive domains. 
 
1.1.3. The interactive environment hypothesis 
A third hypothesis concerning the relationship between cognitive domains in development is an 
environmentally-mediated hypothesis.  This model sees the child’s development as a result of the 
interaction between the child and the environment, where changes to the environment can have a 
substantial effect on development.  Achievements in one domain could thus have an impact on 
another domain via the environment.  There is growing evidence for such cross-domain interactions 
at various developmental stages.  For example, when a baby learns to sit up, she can see the world 
differently and adults may address her differently.  This change in the environment may then lead to 
advances in the infant’s social skills, compared to her peers who are not yet able to sit.  Evidence for 
this type of interaction can be seen in the finding that babies who have not yet learned to sit 
independently and those who have mastered the skill are comparable on measures of face processing, 
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while those who are novice sitters perform worse, indicative of a reorganization taking place within 
the face processing system (Cashon, Ha, Allen, & Barna, 2013).   Another study finds that a baby 
who is given more opportunities to actively engage with objects shows an increase in orienting to 
faces relative to a baby given only passive experience with non-social objects (Libertus & Needham, 
2011).   Furthermore, crawling and walking in infants leads to changes in social interaction from 
parents (Campos et al., 2000; Karasik, Tamis-LeMonda, & Adolph, 2011) and improvements in 
language skills (Iverson, 2010). Overall, the interactionist viewpoint predicts that different cognitive 
domains may be linked, but the underlying mechanism is external to the child.  Such links may thus 
be weaker than a directly shared brain mechanism, or might only be measurable in longitudinal 
studies that track the child and her environment over time. 
 
1.4. Previous studies of social and motor development 
As this brief review summarizes, the domains of mentalizing, mirroring, imitation and motor 
cognition could be unlinked, directly linked or linked via the environment.  There are few previous 
studies of the development of motor and social skills in typical children.  One large project tested 390 
primary school children on fine and gross motor skills, theory of mind, emotion processing and 
cognitive control.   They found the motor skills correlated highly with IQ, language, social and 
attentional skills.  Parent ratings of social behavior were related to measured social skills but not 
motor skills (Dyck et al., 2004).   Several studies have examined the relationship between motor and 
intellectual (not social) skills in children. For example, scores from standardized measures of gross 
cognitive and gross motor abilities are moderately and significantly correlated (Davis, Pitchford, & 
Limback, 2011). Further, this study found that this relationship is largely accounted for by variances 
in visual processing and fine manual control, suggesting that these domains may well be linked via 
the environment. A number of studies have not found any reliable relationship between tasks tapping 
motor and social development, or links that are mediated by other higher order cognitive abilities 
such as memory and visual processing (van der Fels et al., 2014; Wassenberg et al., 2005). 
 
Many more studies have examined motor and social skills in children with developmental disorders 
including autism and developmental coordination disorder (DCD). Children with autism are 
diagnosed on the basis of poor social skills, but up to 80% of them also have developmental 
coordination disorder (Green et al., 2009). Infants at risk of autism (due to having an older sibling 
with a diagnosis) are reported to have poor postural control (Flanagan, Landa, Bhat, & Bauman, 
2012) and difficulties with fine motor and grasping skills (Libertus, Sheperd, Ross, & Landa, 2014). 
Motor difficulties such as these have been found to relate to later social and communicative ability 
(Bhat, Galloway, & Landa, 2012; Leonard, Elsabbagh, Hill, & The BASIS team, 2014)  but although 
motor impairments are related to social abilities in autistic children, the relationship does not stand in 
their unaffected siblings (Hilton, Zhang, Whilte, Klohr, & Constantino, 2012).  In another study, 
autism severity as measured by scores on the Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale (ADOS), 
correlated with a measure of praxis that includes imitation tests, but not with more basic motor skills 
(Dziuk et al., 2007).  Similarly, children with developmental coordination disorder differ from their 
typical peers in their use of social play (Kennedy-Behr, Rodger, & Mickan, 2011). Additionally, 
autistic children’s scores on motor control assessments such as the Movement Assessment Battery 
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for Children (M-ABC) or the Bruininks-Oseretsky Test of Motor Proficiency, Second Edition (BOT-
2) predict the social behavior reported by parents (Hilton et al., 2007). A comparison between a 
group of autistic children and control groups matched for chronological age, motor skill, and 
developmental age suggests the impairment in motor skill is greater than would be expected based on 
ability alone (Staples & Reid, 2010). Similarly, a prospective study of children with DCD found that 
children with higher levels of motor clumsiness at age 5 had fewer social pastimes at age 15 (Cantell, 
Smyth, & Ahonen, 1994). These studies all suggest links between motor and social abilities in 
developmental disorders.  However, many of these studies did not test specific components of motor 
and social cognition, relying instead on reports of behavior from parents or observations. 
 
When more detailed cognitive assessments are carried out, results seem more mixed.  In one 
intriguing study, children who were better able to adapt to lifting a heavy object also performed better 
on theory of mind tasks (Sabbagh, Hopkins, Benson, & Flanagan, 2010), an effect that was not 
explained by age or executive function.  Tests of motor cognition in autism suggest poor motor 
planning (Hughes, 1996) and posture knowledge (Dowell, Mahone, & Mostofsky, 2009) in some 
cases but not others (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007; van Swieten et al., 2010).   Some studies 
report difficulties in chaining actions together in sequences (Cattaneo et al., 2007) but others do not 
(Pascolo & Cattarinussi, 2012).   Detailed testing of visuomotor adaptation in children with autism 
did not find group differences (Gidley Larson et al., 2008; Mostofsky, Bunoski, Morton, Goldberg, & 
Bastian, 2004).   
 
Similar variability is found in studies of how children with autism understand other people’s actions 
– a social component of motor cognition. Some studies report difficulties in answering questions 
about why a person did an action (Boria et al., 2009) or in predicting what will come next in a movie 
(Zalla, Labruyère, Clément, & Georgieff, 2010) but other studies find no differences in the ability to 
make sense of hand gestures (Hamilton et al., 2007).  Studies of imitation show intact performance 
on emulation tasks (copying the goal of an action) but poor performance on mimicry tasks (copying 
precise kinematic features) (Edwards, 2014; Hamilton, 2008).  For example, when participants with 
autism performed a motor task on a touch-screen computer that allowed careful matching of the 
motor, attentional and memory demands between the conditions, they still had poorer accuracy in the 
imitation condition compared to the emulation condition (Stewart, McIntosh, & Williams, 2013).  
There is also a debate about how much imitation difficulties in autism relate to a motor or a cognitive 
deficit (Vanvuchelen, Roeyers, & De Weerdt, 2007). Overall, there is no single aspect of motor 
cognition that can be directly linked to poor social cognition – more research is needed to understand 
how motor and social developmental processes mesh together.  
 
The present paper aims to measure motor abilities and social abilities in a large sample of children, 
using well-defined cognitive tasks.  We aim to go beyond assessments of a child’s everyday behavior 
as measured in parent report or clinical measures.  By tracking specific cognitive processes, we will 
be able to make much stronger links between the development of motor and social skills, and the 
neurocognitive theories of their origins.  The present study uses a cross-sectional design, and thus 
cannot provide a causal account of how strengths in one domain might contribute to strengths in a 
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different domain.  However, it can provide an initial measure of the strength of inter-domain links, 
with a view to future longitudinal studies.  In the following section, we set out and justify the tasks 
used in the present study. 
 
1.5. Testing cognitive development 
To test for links between the motor, mirror and mentalizing domains, we needed a set of cognitive 
tasks that could measure children’s performance in each area.  For the mentalizing domain, we used 
theory of mind tasks, which have been well studied over the last 30 years.  Performance on explicit 
tests of theory of mind becomes reliable from about age 4 (for review see, Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001).  Using a variety of tests with differing complexity, developmental improvements can 
be traced from the age of 3 years up to 8 years or even into adolescence (Calero, Salles, Semelman, 
& Sigman, 2013; Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010).  In the present paper, we used a battery 
of theory of mind tasks drawn from past work (Wellman & Liu, 2004) as our measure of mentalizing 
ability.   
 
To measure the intersection of social and motor processes, we used two types of task which, in 
adults, engage mirror neuron systems in the brain, namely action understanding tasks and imitation 
tasks (Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005).  To assess action understanding, we used a gesture 
recognition task derived from studies of patients with apraxia (Mozaz, Gonzalez Rothi, Anderson, 
Crucian, & Heilman, 2002) in which a child must choose which photograph of a hand gesture would 
best fill the gap in a cartoon action.  We also used a grasp-intention task in which a child must use a 
photograph of how an object is grasped to decide ‘why’ the actor is holding the object –to move it or 
to use it (Boria et al., 2009).  To assess imitation abilities, we instructed children to imitate a series of 
hand / arm actions and measured accuracy.  Instructed imitation is likely to be a better measure of 
mirror system function than the propensity to spontaneously imitate (Vivanti, 2015). 
 
Cognitive tests of motor systems are also not easy to find.  Studies have traditionally focused on the 
performance of tasks relevant to daily life, such as walking or writing (Sugden, 2007).  Here we 
aimed to retain a cognitive focus and use tasks that can be linked to specific motor processes, 
including motor planning, sequencing and prediction.  Thus, we used a bar task which requires the 
child to consider the end posture in an action sequence before beginning to move – a measure of 
motor planning (Cohen & Rosenbaum, 2004; D. Rosenbaum, Cohen, Meulenbroek, & Vaughan, 
2006).  Motor planning skills improve over 3-10 year old age range (Stöckel, Hughes, & Schack, 
2012; Weigelt & Schack, 2015). We also used a sequencing task (Harrington & Haaland, 1992) 
which assessed how long it took to switch between different actions rather than performing the same 
action repeatedly.   
 
1.6. The present study 
The present study aimed to measure specific cognitive processes underlying motor and social skill in 
primary school age children, and to determine how they develop together.  We used several tasks to 
measures performance in four different cognitive domains – of theory of mind, action understanding, 
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imitation and motor control, as detailed above.  The present paper focuses only on the domain-level 
of analysis because the theories that motivated this study are specified at that level.  Analysis of 
performance on individual tasks within each domain will be presented in a different paper.  We tested 
a large sample of children (n = 101) to obtain good statistical power.  A power analysis shows that 
obtaining a medium effect size with 95% power in a multiple regression with seven predictors 
requires a sample size of 89 participants.   If motor and cognitive skills develop from distinct 
cognitive systems, then performance on the theory of mind tasks will not be related to performance 
on the mirroring or motor tasks.  In contrast, if the engagement of a single cognitive system (such as 
the mirror neuron system) drives both motor and social development, then the different cognitive 
domains will correlate tightly across participants.  If motor and social skills are linked only via 
environmental effects, then weak correlations between domains may be observed as well as with IQ.   
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants    
We invited children aged between 4 and 12 years old to participate in the project.  Families were 
contacted through local primary schools and a database of people interested in research.  All parents 
completed an informed consent form before their children took part, and the study was approved by 
the University of Nottingham School of Psychology ethics board. 
For the first phase of the project, parents of 188 children completed four questionnaires – the 
Developmental Coordination Disorder Questionnaire (DCDQ; Wilson et al., 2009), The Social 
Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino & Gruber, 2005) and the Conners 3 ADHD index (Conners 
3AI; Conners 2008), as well as a family background questionnaire collecting data on child’s age, 
languages spoken, socioeconomic status (based on parents’ jobs) and any developmental concerns 
about their child. A more detailed analysis of this phase of the project will be reported elsewhere.  
 
Of the 188 children, 101 participated in the second phase of this project which involved detailed 
cognitive testing.  Data from all 101 is reported here.  This sample was not selected entirely at 
random.  First, the availability of children and schools for testing constrained the choice of 
participants.  Second, children whose scores on either the SRS or the DCDQ were towards either end 
of the distribution of scores obtained from the phase one sample were deliberately oversampled.  This 
is because a fully random sample would include many children with mid-range scores.  By 
oversampling children with extreme scores, we maximized the variance in abilities among the 
children tested and increased our power to detect associations between the different measures in our 
study.  None of the children tested had a formal diagnosis of developmental delay, but some were 
receiving additional support from their school or undergoing assessments for difficulties. 
 
2.2. Cognitive testing    
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The 101 children who completed cognitive testing were assessed by a trained researcher in a quiet 
room at their school or at the University of Nottingham.  They completed the following tasks spread 
over two – four sessions.    
2.3. Mentalizing assessment  
This included widely used theory of mind tasks - the diverse desires task, diverse beliefs task, 
knowledge access task, explicit false-belief task, implicit false-belief task and contents false-belief 
task were used as in Hamilton, Brindley and Frith (2007).  A child was given 1 point for each task 
where they passed control questions and demonstrated theory of mind.  Children completed 6 
sequences of a picture-sequencing task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986) and were given 1 point 
for each fully correct answer and a score of .5 was given if the final picture of a sequence was correct 
but the second and third were in the wrong order.  Children completed 6 trials of a penny-hiding task 
(Gratch, 1964) which is an interactive measure of strategic mentalizing. The child was given one 
point for each appropriate attempt to hide a coin from the experimenter. Scores for all the theory of 
mind tasks (6 classic tasks, 6 picture sequencing trials and 6 penny hiding trials) were totaled for 
each child. The data were then linearly scaled so that the sample mean was zero and standard 
deviation was 1.  Inspection of the quantile plots in R showed no substantial deviation from 
normality so no further data transformations were applied. 
2.4. Mirror system assessment 
This included tests of imitation, intention understanding and posture knowledge.  In the imitation 
task, the experimenter sat opposite the child and asked the child to watch the action and then to copy 
as closely as possible as if looking in a mirror.  The experimenter demonstrated with the hand 
mirroring the child’s dominant hand, and the child used his/her dominant hand to respond.  One 
practice trial was given to ensure the instructions were understood.  Children performed 6 trials with 
meaningful actions and 6 with meaningless actions (blocked, with block order counterbalanced) and 
performance was scored from video. Two trained raters coded all videos for overall imitation quality 
(0, 1 or 2) and specific error types, but only the former are reported here. Reasonable inter-rater 
reliability was achieved (Cohen’s weighted kappa was .75).  Quality scores were summed for each 
child and averaged across raters, giving a score out of 24.  As before, data were linearly scaled to 
have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.  Inspection of the quantile plots in R showed 
deviation from normality that was best corrected with by squaring the values, so this transformation 
was applied. 
The intention understanding task was based on Boria et al. (2009).  New picture stimuli were 
generated showing a hand touching, lifting or using a variety of everyday objects.  Stimuli were 
piloted with typical adults to ensure that the objects and actions could be clearly identified.  On each 
trial, the child first saw a card with a picture of an everyday object and was asked – what is it?  
Responses were 99.7% correct.  Then the child was asked if the hand was holding or touching the 
object.  For the holding images, the child was asked – why is he holding it?  To use it or to move it?  
10 different objects were photographed, resulting in 10 hold-to-use photos and 10 hold-to-move 
photos.  Responses to the ‘why’ question for each of these 20 photos were scored with 1 point for 
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each correct answer, giving a score out of 20.  The posture knowledge task was identical to that used 
by Hamilton, Brindley and Frith (2007).  On each trial, the children saw a cartoon of a person 
performing an action with the hands missing, together with three photos of hands in different 
postures and were asked ‘which hands fill the gap?’  Correct responses were given 1 point with a 
total score out of 16.  Scores on the intention understanding task and the posture knowledge task 
were summed for each child.  As before, data were linearly scaled to have a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of 1.  Inspection of the quantile plots in R showed no substantial deviation from 
normality so no further data transformation was applied. 
2.5. Motor assessment   
This included two tasks – a test of motor planning and a test of motor sequencing.  The motor 
planning task was based on Rosenbaum et al (1990), and previously used in autism research 
(Hamilton et al., 2007; Hughes, 1996).  On each trial, the child saw a bar with two ends of different 
colors resting horizontally on a rest 10cm above the table, and two targets (paper disks on the table) 
of different colors.  They were asked to place one end of the bar on one of the targets (e.g. place the 
red end on the black target).  On four trials, this could be comfortably achieved by grasping the bar at 
the start of the trial with an overhand grip, while on four trials the less-common underhand grip was 
more appropriate.  Typical adults are able to plan their movements to end in a comfortable posture by 
adopting a less-common posture at the start of the action (Rosenbaum, Cohen, Meulenbroek, & 
Vaughan, 2006) and this ability develops over childhood (Adalbjornsson, Fischman, & Rudisill, 
2008).  Thus, this task assesses motor planning.  Children received a score out of 8 with one point for 
each trial where the appropriate grip was used.  Motor planning scores were linearly scaled to have a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.   
The motor sequencing task was based on Harrington and Haaland (1992), and aimed to assess motor 
speed and the ability to switch between actions.  The apparatus was a set of black boxes each with 
one movable part – a switch to flick, a button to push or a dial to twist.  On each trial, the 
experimenter prepared an array of five of these boxes in a specific order (e.g. flick, twist, twist, flick, 
flick).  When the child was ready with his/her hand on the start location on the left of the desk, the 
experimenter revealed the array of boxes and the child moved his/her hand along the array 
performing each action in turn.  Trials were videoed and the time from moving away from the start-
location to moving away from the last action was coded.  40% of videos were second scored and the 
correlation between the two scorers was r = .93.   Some box sequences contained no transitions (e.g. 
push-push-push-push) while others contained one, two, three or four transitions (e.g. push-twist-
push-twist-push).  Data were analyzed by fitting each child’s movement time on each trial to a linear 
model with five predictors: one for each action (flick/push/twist), one for transition time (coded 1 for 
switch and 0 for a stay) and one for learning (a linear decrease over the 15 trials).  Outliers in these 
parameter estimates were identified as values 3 standard deviations above/below the mean (n = 8 out 
of 404 data points) and replaced with the group mean.  
To combine the motor task scores into a single score for each child, the following transformations 
were applied.  First, values for each score (motor planning; flick-time; push-time; twist-time; 
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transition time; learning) were linearly scaled so that each full set of scores had a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of 1.  The combined motor score was then defined as:  - (flick-time + push-time + 
twist-time) / 3 + motor planning – transition time using the linearly scaled scores for each.  Timing 
values were negative to ensure that larger values reflect better performance, consistent with other 
data in this analysis.  Inspection of quantile plots showed no substantial deviation from normality so 
no further data transformation was applied. 
2.6. IQ assessment 
Raven’s colored progressive matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) were used to measure each 
child’s nonverbal IQ (nvIQ).  Raw scores (not normed scored) were then linearly scaled to have a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one, in line with other data in this analysis.  Inspection of the 
quantile plots in R showed no substantial deviation from normality so no further data transformation 
was applied. 
2.7. Parent report scores 
Parents completed the SRS, the DCDQ and Conners 3 AI scale.  Scores on these scales correlated 
highly, and a detailed analysis of these data will be reported elsewhere.  Descriptive statistics on the 
raw scores are presented in Table 1 to illustrate the sample of children tested here.  The present study 
focused on cognitive performance, so we combined the parent report scores into a single factor 
reflecting parent concerns.  To create the factor, we first inspected the raw scores on each of the three 
parent-report instruments (SRS, DCDQ and Conners) using quantile plots in R.  DCD-Q scores were 
then squared to reduce the deviation from normality.  SRS scores and Conners scores were inverted 
so that a larger value indicates better performance (to be consistent with all other measures).  Each 
transformed score was then linearly scaled to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, and 
the scores were summed for each child.  This gives a combined parent-report measure that weights 
social, motor and attentional concerns equally, and which gives higher values to children showing 
better performance across these domains. Each child’s primary caregiver was asked for their current 
occupation and responses were coded using the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ILO, 2012) where higher values indicate lower socioeconomic status. 
Table 1. Characteristics of 101 participants 
  
  mean SD min max 
Age (years) 7.88 1.69 4.88 11.55 
SES 3.13 1.5 1 9 
Attention (Conners) 5.4 6.0 0 20 
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Motor skill (DCDQ) 56.6 14.2 16 75 
Social development (SRS) 40.9 31.8 0 145 
nvIQ (Raven's raw score) 25.4 6.6 11 36 
  
    
Handedness 10 left 3 ambidextrous 88 right 
Gender 60 male 41 female  
Any parental concern about 
possible developmental 
issues 76 no 35 yes  
 
 
2.8. Statistical analysis 
Data for 101 children were available.  As described above, scores on each individual task were 
transformed to ensure that the data were normally distributed and linearly scaled to ensure that higher 
values reflect better performance.  This gave summary scores for each of the following domains: 
Theory of Mind; imitation; mirroring; motor skill; non-verbal IQ; parent report; together with age 
and gender data for each child.  The correlations between each of these sets of summary scores were 
calculated.  Then four general linear models (GLM) were set up to test which factors predicted each 
of the four cognitive domains of interest.  For example, the Theory of Mind model tested how their 
imitation score, mirroring score, motor score, nvIQ, parent score, age and gender, predicted a child’s 
Theory of Mind score.  The imitation model tested how their ToM score, mirroring score, motor 
score, nvIQ, parent score, age and gender, predicted a child’s imitation score.  Effectively, these 
models tested whether performance in each cognitive domain was accounted for by general effects 
(e.g. nvIQ) or if performance was closely linked to another cognitive domain. 
To further probe the data, we conducted a number of exploratory analyses.  First, we excluded all 
children for whom parents had indicated a developmental concern, that is, all children who are 
receiving additional help at school or undergoing assessments for a developmental disorder.  Then 
we re-ran the GLM models on the remaining sample of typical children.  This checks if our results 
are driven only by the atypical children in the sample.  Second, we split the sample into 3 age bands 
with equal numbers of children in each band.  We then re-ran the GLM models on these three 
samples.  This checks if links between different domains might be apparent in only some age ranges.  
However, both these analyses are conducted on smaller samples and have reduced statistical power.  
 To explore cross-domain links in the full sample without confounds of age, we examined 
correlations between the residuals of each domain after removing effects of age, nonverbal IQ and 
gender.  Specifically, we set up a GLM predicting theory of mind performance as a function of age, 
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nonverbal IQ and gender.  We took the residuals from this model as a measure of each child’s theory 
of mind performance after age, gender and IQ effects are removed.  In the same way, we set up three 
separate GLMs of mirroring performance; motor performance and imitation each as functions of age, 
nonverbal IQ and gender.  We took the residuals of all four models and examine the pattern of 
correlations between them.  This gives insight into the relationship between different cognitive 
domains across the full sample of 101 children but without any confounding effects of age or IQ.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Correlations 
The correlations between all the scores in the complete dataset are illustrated in Figure 1.  Note that 
correction for multiple comparisons has not been applied, but an appropriate Bonferroni threshold for 
21 comparisons would be p < .002.  Correlations between almost all measures were high; with the 
exception that parent questionnaire scores did not correlate with motor scores, theory of mind scores 
or age, using the corrected significance threshold. 
 
 
3.2. General linear models 
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Four GLM analyses were performed, to test the relationship between performance on the cognitive 
tasks and parent report in different domains.  Results of these analyses are presented in Table 2. 
Model 1 found that theory of mind scores could be predicted based on age and non-verbal IQ but 
were not related to motor, imitation or mirror system performance.  Model 2 found that motor scores 
could be predicted from gender and non-verbal IQ, with imitation skill as a marginal predictor.  Note 
that this model had a weaker overall fit (adjusted R2 = .28) than any of the other models.  Model 3 
found that mirror system scores could be predicted from imitation scores and non-verbal IQ, but 
motor and theory of mind scores did not contribute.  Model 4 showed that imitation scores could be 
predicted from age, parent questionnaires and mirror system scores, with motor scores as a marginal 
predictor. 
 
Table 2. Results of the GLM analyses performed to test the relationship between performance 
on the cognitive tasks and parent report measures 
Model 1: Theory of Mind b SE t ß p 
 Overall model F = 12.69, df = 7,93, p<.0001, adj r2 = 0.45 
 Intercept  -.96 .50 -1.92 -.96 .058 
 Gender  -.09 .16 -.54 -.09 .592 
 Age  .13 .06 2.09 .13 .039* 
 Parent Questionnaires .03 .03 .99 .03 .325 
 Motor  .05 .05 .94 .05 .350 
 Imitation  .12 .11 1.19 .13 .237 
 MNS  .10 .07 1.50 .10 .137 
 non-verbal IQ .26 .10 2.63 .26 .010* 
        
Model 2: Motor b SE t ß p 
 Overall model F = 6.53, df = 7,93, p<.0001, adj r2 = .28 
 Intercept  -1.01 1.06 -.95 -1.01 .343 
 Gender  -.79 .32 -2.48 -.79 .015* 
 Age  .19 .13 1.45 .19 .150 
 Parent Questionnaires -.07 .07 -1.01 -.07 .313 
 ToM  .20 .22 .94 .20 .350 
 Imitation  .37 .22 1.72 .37 .089 
 MNS  -.06 .14 -.41 -.06 .682 
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 non-verbal IQ .41 .21 1.99 .42 .049* 
        
Model 3: Mirroring b SE t ß p 
 Overall model F=13.76, df = 7,93, p<.0001, adj r2 = .47 
 Intercept  -1.21 .79 -1.52 -1.21 .132 
 Gender  .01 .25 .05 .01 .961 
 Age  .15 .10 1.56 .15 .122 
 Parent Questionnaires .05 .05 .94 .05 .352 
 ToM  .24 .16 1.50 .24 .137 
 Motor  -.03 .08 -.41 -.03 .682 
 Imitation  .48 .16 3.02 .48 .003** 
 non-verbal IQ .41 .16 2.62 .41 .010* 
        
Model 4: Imitation b SE t ß p 
 Overall model F=13.49, df=7,93, p<0.0001, adj r2=.47 
 Intercept  -1.67 .47 -3.56 -1.67 .001 
 Gender  .24 .15 1.55 .24 .125 
 Age  .19 .06 3.34 .19 .001** 
 Parent Questionnaires .07 .03 2.18 .07 .032* 
 ToM  .12 .10 1.19 .12 .237 
 Motor  .08 .05 1.72 .08 .089 
 MNS  .19 .06 3.02 .19 .003** 
  non-verbal IQ -.10 .10 -1.00 -.10 .318 
 
 
Overall, the correlation analysis and the GLM models provide a consistent picture. Imitation and 
mirror system performance are related to each other, and are weakly linked to motor skill.  Theory of 
mind scores are linked to nvIQ but not to any of the motor scores.  To summarize these results, we 
illustrate the factors which reliably predict performance in each of the four cognitive domains in 
Figure 2.  
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3.3. Further exploratory analyses 
We performed several exploratory analyses to check the robustness of our results.  First, we 
implemented the four GLM models on the data from the 76 children for whom there was no parental 
report of any developmental concerns.  Results for the ToM model showed that parent report scores 
were a reliable predictor of performance (p = .039) but no other predictors were significant.  Results 
for the Motor model showed that gender (p = .034) and nvIQ (p = .026) were reliable predictors, 
replicating the pattern found in the full sample.  Results for the mirroring model showed that 
imitation (p = .0049) and nvIQ (p = .027) were reliable predictors, replicating the pattern found in the 
full sample.  Results for the Imitation model showed that age (p = .034), parent reports (p = .028) and 
Mirroring (p = .0049) were reliable predictors, replicating the pattern found in the full sample.   Thus, 
the analysis of data from only children with no developmental concerns gave a very similar pattern to 
the full data sample, with no indication of stronger relationships between cognitive domains in this 
more homogenous sample.  
 
Second, we split the data into three sub-samples by age: a young group of 33 children aged 4.8 – 6.7 
years; a mid-aged group of 33 children aged 6.8 to 9 years and an old group of 34 children aged 9-
11.5 years.  We implemented the GLM models on data from each sub-sample separately.   In these 12 
GLMs, the only predictors meeting the p < .05 threshold were: in the young group, nvIQ predicts 
mirroring performance; in the mid-aged group, Mirroring, Imitation and Motor performance were all 
reliable predictors of each other; in the old group, Ravens predicted motor performance and age 
predicted mirroring performance.  There were no indications of strong relationships between the 
specific cognitive domains that differ from our main report in these subsamples, though we note that 
these analyses are likely to be underpowered. 
 
Third, we aimed to examine each cognitive domain without confounding effects of age and IQ.   To 
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do this, we modelled performance in each of the four cognitive domains separately as a function of 
age, nonverbal IQ and gender.  We took the residuals from each model as measures of each child’s 
domain performance without any age, gender or IQ effects.  We took the residuals of all four models 
and examined the pattern of correlations between them.  This gives insight into the relationship 
between different cognitive domains across the full sample of 101 children but without any 
confounding effects of age or IQ.  Correlations in this model were given in Table 3.  The only 
correlation which survives an appropriate correction for multiple comparisons (p <.005) is the 
correlation between imitation and mirroring, a result also found in our primary analysis.  
Table 3. Results of the residuals correlation   
 ToM Motor Imitation MNS parent report 
ToM  0.12 0.23 0.23 0.16 
Motor .248  0.17 0.03 -0.04 
Imitation .019 .089  0.36 0.26 
MNS .020 .802 .000  0.19 
parent report .117 .661 .009 .054  
 Note. Upper triangle indicates correlation coefficient, lower triangle indicates p values 
 
4. Discussion 
In this study of 101 children, we examined cognitive performance across the motor and social 
domains.  We found that performance on theory of mind tasks was independent of action 
understanding, imitation and motor skill.  However, action understanding and imitation were closely 
related, and somewhat linked to motor skill.  These results have important implications for theories 
of how different cognitive domains develop and are related to one another. 
In the introduction, we set out three possible models for the relationship between social and motor 
skills.  These skills could develop independently, they could be fully integrated or they could be 
linked via the environment.  The present data do not give support to a wholly integrated model 
(hypothesis 2) such as the action cognition framework set out by Gallese et al. (2009). With that 
theory comes the testable hypothesis that performance on tasks tapping motor cognition, the mirror 
neuron system and social cognition will all be necessarily related.  In our data, imitation and action 
understanding were closely linked, and weakly correlated to motor cognition.  This supports the 
claim that the process of understanding another agent’s action involves the recruitment of a 
perception-action network.  However, the social abilities measured with theory of mind tasks were 
independent of mirror and motor skills.  This argues against the hypothesis that difficulties in social 
cognition cascade downstream from impaired motor cognition, or that shared understanding of 
perception and action contributes to mentalizing.  It remains possible that social and motor cognition 
could be more integrated at earlier stages of development than was considered by the present study 
and it may be that it becomes increasingly modularized across development or the relationship may 
differ when different components of motor cognition are considered (e.g., Sabbagh et al., 2010).  
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In contrast, our data align well with the cognitive task distinctions suggested by adult neuroimaging 
data and by traditional cognitive theories.  In neuroimaging studies, action understanding and 
imitation engage the same brain systems; partially overlapping with other motor skills, while theory 
of mind engages different systems.  Similarly, in our developmental data, action understanding and 
imitation are mutually predictive, and have a weak relationship to motor skill.   
Our data cannot rule out the possibility that different cognitive domains interact over developmental 
time, linked by the environment.  There is evidence for this in some longitudinal studies.  For 
example, questionnaire data from over 62,000 children as part of a cohort study revealed that motor 
skill at 18 months predicted communication skills at 3 years (Wang, Lekhal, Aarø, & Schjølberg, 
2014). Bart, Hajami and Bar-Haim (2007) found that motor skills in kindergarten predicted study 
skills and disruptive behavior (but barely predicted social behavior) a year later.  Ommundsen, 
Gundersen, and Mjaavatn (2010) found that motor skill in 1st grade predicted social status in 4th 
grade, measured in 80 children.  Note that all these studies used self-report or teacher report measures 
of social behavior, rather than cognitive tests.  Thus, it remains unclear if motor cognition can be 
directly linked to social cognition in a longitudinal fashion. 
Our data also cannot rule out the possibility that there are links between performance on specific 
tasks within different cognitive domains, which does not emerge when performance in each domain 
is combined as we have done here.  For example, Davis et al found that subscores in tests of visual 
processing and fine manual control were correlated in a group of 4-11 year old children and that this 
task-level effect drove the link between motor and intelligence domains.  It is possible that there are 
similar relationships between specific tasks in our study, but unfortunately there are too many tasks 
and not enough participants to implement the PCA or task-level analysis used by Davis et al.  It 
would be interesting to test if specific tasks or specific cognitive sub-components are linked across 
domains in future work.     
4.1. Clinical relevance 
The results of the present study have implications for how we understand disorders of both social and 
motor cognition. For instance, if motor and social skills develop independently of each other, as the 
data presented here suggest, then it is not clear why there is such a high degree of co-morbidity of 
autism and developmental coordination disorder.  The present study did not test children with a 
diagnosis of autism or DCD, but some children were undergoing assessments for a variety of 
developmental concerns.  This enabled us to test a larger and more variable sample.  However, 
without participants diagnosed with disorders, it is not possible to know if the same relationships 
between motor and social skills hold on that sample.  It is possible, for example, that motor cognition 
and theory of mind are closely linked in autism even if they are not linked in a typical sample.  It is 
possible that the relationship is qualitatively different in atypical populations and that cognitive 
systems may be more interdependent and have increasing cascade effects on each other. 
Alternatively, it may be that an underlying neurological susceptibility to cognitive delay or deficit 
may similarly affect abilities that are reasonably unrelated in typical development.  
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The independence between mentalizing ability and motor cognition in this study has implications for 
the design of interventions for those who are at a social or motoric disadvantage. For example, there 
have been studies exploring the effects of interventions targeting imitation skill in autism to improve 
social emotional functioning (Ingersoll, 2012). While Ingersoll found improvements in social 
emotional functioning when children were followed-up were related to treatment it was not clear that 
improvements in imitation was the mechanism through which these improvements were manifest.  
4.2. Strengths and weaknesses 
This study is limited in some ways.  Most of our experimental measures were based on previously 
published work, to ensure robustness.  However, our measure of motor sequencing was novel and has 
not previously been used with children.  The sequencing task requires children to complete a series of 
actions, where the number of switches from one action type to another can vary.  Reaction time was 
measured from video coding which may also have introduced an element of error. Furthermore, the 
novelty of this task makes it difficult to determine what optimal performance should look like. Some 
of the measures used produced some ceiling effects and so were not capturing the full variance that 
exists in the population for these measures. This was particularly the case for the Theory of Mind 
tasks and despite normalizing the distribution it may be that the distribution of scores would have had 
greater variance in a younger sample or if more implicit measures of mentalizing were used. 
Furthermore, the questionnaires used to measure parental reports of a child’s behaviors are designed 
to be used as screening measures for differentiating children who potentially have a clinical diagnosis 
from those who do not and as such they were not designed to measure ability equally across the 
entire range of typical social, motor and attentional ability.   
There are also several statistical and analysis issues which could affect our conclusions.  First, our 
sampling strategy involved selecting children for cognitive testing who had extreme scores on the 
parent report measures, in order to maximize the variance in our sample.  While none of the children 
in our sample have a clinically diagnosed developmental disorder, it is possible that this sampling 
method could bias our results if there are discontinuities between typical and atypical development.  
The fact that we find similar results when we analyse data only from children with no developmental 
concerns argues that our sampling method did not introduce strong biases into our analysis.  Second, 
it is possible that performance in different cognitive domains changes non-linearly with age.  Our 
analysis uses only linear models and cannot capture this.  Substantially larger sample sizes would be 
needed to examine nonlinear age effects.  Finally, we tested children across a wide age range but did 
not have enough participants to break down the dataset into smaller, more homogenous groups to test 
if the relationship between cognitive domains changes over development. 
This study did, however, have some areas of strength. First, the large sample offered good statistical 
power to detect relationships between multiple variables.  The results we found are consistent in both 
our primary GLM analysis, which takes a conservative approach to testing for strong relationships 
between cognitive domains, and in three further exploratory analyses which tested for these 
relationships in sub-samples of the data.  Second, the present study employed cognitive tasks that 
were measuring children’s abilities in certain domains rather than their parent’s perception of their 
ability relative to normative performance. This is a very important distinction as it allows for a more 
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fine-grained exploration of the component aspects of cognition that would be too difficult to elicit in 
questionnaires. The relationship between parent measures in these domains with children’s 
performance on related tasks from the current sample will be explored in more detail elsewhere. 
4.3. Conclusions 
The data presented in the current study suggest that different domains of social and motor skill, 
specifically the theory of mind domain and the mirroring domain, are relatively independent in this 
sample.  This argues against a ‘single domain hypothesis’, but is compatible with an ‘independent 
domains’ hypothesis or an ‘interactive environment’ hypothesis.  Longitudinal data will be needed to 
discriminate and further test these hypotheses, and thus to better understand the ways in which 
different cognitive processes interact across motor and social development. This is especially the case 
in developmental disorders when the development of these cognitive capacities may be 
incommensurate with each other and in turn with the requirements of the environment, leading to 
functional impairment. Intervention studies should be used to not only address questions of efficacy 
and effectiveness at improving motor and social proficiency but also in order to test the mechanisms 
through which social and motor skill develop in concert or autonomously.   We suggest that future 
research should adopt a cognitive approach to the measurement of motor skill, mirror neuron system 
functioning, and social cognition in clinical and non-clinical control groups in order to test and 
develop our understanding of the mechanisms of development. 
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